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This book is the second in the framework of an interdisciplinary project (“CONFLIPOL”), 
which aimed at demonstrating how the “politicisation” of internal or international conflicts 
leads to changes in the political field of interaction. The approach is broad and vast. The 
initial volume, published in 2010, demonstrated how internal conflicts created “the political”, 
aloof from other societal spheres, and were interwoven with processes of politicisation from 
the Middle Ages on1. The emphasis is on bottom-up actors’ conceptions, practices and 
political language, rather than on top-down construction of the state. Alain Hugon and Yann 
Lagadec, the present volume’s editors, trace a roadmap for the analysis of international 
conflicts (9-23) around four spheres: conflicts and state construction (25-91), mobilisations 
and resistances (93-167), occupation and politisation (169-219) and, finally, new public 
spaces (221-313).  
In spite of this clear repartition, numerous alternative themes emerge throughout the book. 
The selection of contributions is very extensive, conformable to the editors’ original intent. 
After reading through all fifteen articles, one could wonder whether the joint analysis of 
domestic and international politics constitutes anything new at all. Common theoretical 
explanations are rare, and synthesis is near impossible, due to the extreme variety of cases 
across space and time. The studies collected in the volume aim to transcend the formal-
institutional stage, and show how relationships between the public at large and government 
were transformed by international conflict. Constructions of authority and “the political” show 
various lively processes and debates, wherein similar factors produce different outcomes. As 
pointed out in Laurent Bourquin’s conclusions (315-321), the classical emergence of the 
state from a fiscal-military complex2 and the autonomisation of the political discursive arena 
are linked. Yet, this is not a new insight. The interest of this book lies in the detailed case 
studies.  
Martin Wrede (77-90) presents the case of the German traditional arch-enemies: France and 
the Turk. Jan Sobieski’s 1683 victory on the Kahlenberg marked a watershed in the German 
perception of the Ottoman Empire, ending apocalyptic representations of a danger perceived 
as imminent and real. For Austria, although Turkish wars did not disappear, the Prussian 
menace surpassed that of the Sultan. A fiercer competitor for the title of “Second Turk” was, 
of course, Louis XIV. Istanbul and Paris were depicted as similar places of moral depravation 
and military aggression. Sobieski’s victory turned Louis into the sole enemy. Revoking the 
Edict of Nantes turned the King of France into the `primogenitus Satanae’, in spite of French 
ambitions to act as guarantor of Protestant freedoms and liberties. Yet, `Ludovicus impius` 
was still considered a fellow Christian. Polemical insults were not congruent with cultural and 
commercial affinities, or even political necessity in the management of the European 
Balance. 
Hervé Drévillon tackles the quintessential interaction of international conflict: warfare (107-
125). The controversy on the ‘limited’ character of Ancien Régime warfare can not only be 
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read as an addition of military capability and casualties. Drévillon argues that the step from a 
‘war of princes’ to a ‘war of populations’ is at the heart of the historiographical discussion. 
Mass mobilisation is often presented as a synonym of intensification, whereas the author 
notes the total absence of consensus on the criteria to call the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars a watershed. Neither (proportionate) losses nor army sizes exceeded those of Louis 
XIV’s time. Consequently, only the political criterion formulated by Clausewitz, can be said to 
have been relevant. War as an affair of government is intrinsically more limited and 
controlled than if left to the passions of the vulgus. Drévillon argues that the restrained 
violence of the ‘guerre en dentelles’ was the product of cruel and brutal army discipline. 
Troops feared above all murderous platoon fire. For Voltaire, instinctive popular ferocity was 
reined in by the moderation of transnational and civilised European elites. Enlightenment and 
Revolution ameliorated the soldier’s image by turning him into a citizen, in contrast to the 
brutal customs of war. Inalienable honour and dignity became common to individual soldiers 
as well as citizens. The 1791 Military Code symbolized this development, separating military 
discipline and criminal law. For contemporaries, the turn of the 18th century changed the 
relationship between populations and armed conflict, but not in the essentialist terms often 
used in military historiography. 
Valérie Toureille (169-182) treats the case of the écorcheurs (literally: road runners who strip 
off human skin from corpses, 170) during the Hundred Years War. Professional mercenary 
gangs raided the French and Burgundian countryside, the Estates of the latter duchy 
convening no less than fifteen times between 1436 and 1443, in order to bribe potential 
aggressors (173). Toureille explains the outburst of pillaging and cruelties after the peace of 
Arras by the need for mercenary captains to pay out the promises made to their men (175). 
She links these practices to customary medieval ius in bello. The main culprits are pardoned 
and integrated in the French military afterwards (178). Toureille does not turn a blind eye to 
their mischiefs, but states that they were no worse than other French men of war. Moreover, 
pillaging on enemy soul suited the King’s strategic objectives (179). If the latter took action at 
Burgundian diplomats’ request, this only served to enlist undisciplined bands for public 
service and thus to establish a state monopoly on the exercise of violence.  
Jean-Marie Le Gall (221-244) elaborates on urban politicisation around the battle of Pavia, 
where Francis I was taken prisoner by Charles V (1525). The event passes almost unnoticed 
in French historiography (222). Le Gall admits this is correct regarding the uncontroversial 
geopolitical, external aspects of the lost battle. However, Queen Louise of Savoy, acting as 
Regent, had to face several calls for internal political economic reforms by regional estates, 
cities and courts (234). Especially the “bonnes villes” of the kingdom were associated to 
policy, implying concessions, e.g. for the ratification of the peace treaty of Moore with 
England (239). In the latter case, the Parisians refused to have their personal possessions 
mortgaged as a security for British claims against the French crown (241). The treaty, 
concluded on 30 August, had not been approved by the Parisian general assembly by the 
end of the year. These events explain why Charles V could hope that the fear of a major 
political crisis in France would push his captive, Francis I, to concessions (243). The latter 
famously reneged his own signature once returned to France. The internal quarrels caused 
by his absence were more urgent than a reliable peace agreement.  
Edmond Dziembowski (245-258) presents French public opinion during the Seven Years 
War and the War of American Independence. In 1778, foreign secretary Vergennes was 
warned by the publicist Favier that excessive anti-British propaganda would come across as 
official endorsement for Anglo-American principles of popular sovereignty (246). Favier 
feared that provinces as Brittanny or the Languedoc might end their voluntary union to the 
French crown, just as the Dutch Republic had done with that of Spain. Dziembowski points 
out that French official propaganda had been busy for twenty years educating the public on 
conflicts with Britain. Struggles far away were presented as relevant. The ministry 
emphasised the fragility of the quarrel-ridden British parliamentary system, countering the 
pernicious influence of anglophile French authors as Montesquieu (248). However, as the 
military odds turned against France, official propaganda started translating British pamphlets 
and newspapers critical to Pitt the Older’s government. This tendency resurfaced with the 
War of American independence, albeit with texts of a fundamentally different nature. The 
ideas of John Locke and Thomas Paine were printed in French by official governmental 
publications, as if Ancien Régime censorship had been abolished with a single “suicidal” 
(255) stroke. As conservative a man as Vergennes, who treated the 1782 Genevan 
insurgents of “fanatics”, would have closed his eyes for the radicalism of the Declaration of 
Independence ? Dziembowski sees the explanation in the disconnect between the minister’s 
awareness of geopolitical balances (favourable to France in 1776), on the one hand, and the 
radicalisation of internal political thought, on the other hand (256). 
David González-Cruz focuses on foreigners in Spain and Latin America during 18th century 
wars (281-298). Generally speaking, the Spanish Bourbons were averse to strangers trading 
in their colonies. In case of an armed conflict, alien private property was eagerly seized to 
compensate for war expenses (288). Yet, the special relationship with Britain after the Peace 
of Utrecht, and foremost that with France, made exceptions necessary. Merchants exploited 
the quickly changing relations of alliance and enmity, declaring themselves French citizen or 
Spanish resident according to the most favourable legal status of the moment. The 
Revolution caused a shift in perceptions, as French refugees became symbols of subversive 
ideas (289).  
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